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1. Introduction 
 
It has been claimed that conversations is the basic form of social organization 
(cf.Schegloff (1986) and it seems correct to say that conversation, or with a more 
general term dialogue (from the Greek dia logos through words), exhibits 
characteristics which are basic to social organization. It coordinates information and 
mutual understanding and it involves building social cohesion. This paper is about 
some aspects of how social cohesion is created through dialogue and addresses 
questions like: What is it that keeps a dialogue going? Why is it normally impossible 
to terminate a conversation by suddenly turning around and walking away, even if 
your interlocutor has finished his/her turn at speaking? To put it briefly, the aim is to 
analyze the glue of dialogue. 
 
 
2. Multilayered constraints and enablements 
 
The first thing to notice is perhaps the complexity of the relations that are established 
between the participants in a dialogue. (The kind of dialogue I will primarily have in 
mind throughout the paper is spoken dialogue, the perhaps most basic kind of human 
dialogue. However, many of the claims will be generalizable to other forms of 
human dialogue, e.g. written dialogue using electronic media.) At least the following 
levels of organisation are involved in human dialogue, where each level provides 
necessary but not sufficient enablements and constraints on human communication. 
 
(i)  Physical: The communicators are physical entities and their communicative 
 contributions are physical processes. 
 
(ii)  Biological: The communicators are biological organisms whose 
 communicative contributions from this perspective can be seen as biological 
 activation and directed behavior. 
 
(iii)  Psychological: 
(A) Perception, understanding and emotion: The communicators are 
 perceiving understanding and emotional beings whose communicative contri- 
 butions are perceptually comprehensible and emotionally charged phenomena. 
 
 (B) Motivation, rationality and agency: The communicators are motivated 
 (including ethical, cooperative motives), rational agents whose communicative 
 contributions, consequently, are motivated, rational acts (compare Grice (1975) 
 and Allwood (1976)). 
 (iv) Social: 
A: Culture, social institution, language. The communicators are, at least 
provisionally, members of a culture, of a social institution and of a linguistic 
community, and their communicative contributions can, therefore, be characterized as 
cultural, social institutional and linguistic acts. 
 
B: Activity: The communicators normally, play a role in a social activity and their 
communicative contributions are contributions to that activity through their role, e.g, 
as a sales clerk telling a customer about the price of some goods or a teacher lecturing 
to students. 
 
C: Communication. The communicators normally, at a given point in time, focus 
more on either sending or receiving information, i.e., they are primarily either in the 
sender, (speaker, writer, etc.) role or in the receiver (listener, reader, etc.) role. In the 
sending role, they are mostly performing a particular communicative act which makes 
them the agent of actions such as stating, asking, requesting, etc. Ibis leads to 
characterizations of their communicative contributions by such labels as; sent 
message, speech, writing, statement, question and request. 
 
Since dialogue, in this way, involves a network of finely interwoven enablements and 
constraints, the "glue" or "cohesion" at work in dialogue must be construed in a similar 
multilayered way. One of the consequences is that dialogue and the successive contributions 
to dialogue are characterized by such features as redundancy, predictability, recoverability 
and, given the constraints on human perception and attention, a certain indeterminacy with 
regard to the relevance of its various dimensions. 
In order, however, to analyze the redundancy in the "glue", the layers have to be described 
both individually and in relation to each other. It is to this task that I now turn, in trying to 
describe some aspects of what I have called communicative cohesion. 
 
In order to facilitate the discussion I will start by characterizing the basic concepts that 1 
will use in describing dialogues. 
 
1 . Contribution: The basic individual communicative unit of a dialogue 1 will call a 
contribution. A contribution can be defined as a sequence of communicative behavior 
bounded by lack of activity. If activity should cease during a contribution (eg by 
pausing while speaking), the pause must not be filled by another communicator's 
contribution, nor must it be so long that it is more reasonable to regard renewed 
activation as a new contribution. The unit in spoken language corresponding to a 
contribution is an utterance. This will be the unit I mainly consider in the following. 
 
2.  Turn: Besides utterances, it is also convenient to distinguish turns. A turn can be 
defined as a right to communicate and is a normative rather than a behavioral unit. A 
turn is, thus, often but not always, coterminous with an utterance. Consider the 
following 
examples: 
 
(1)  A:  It's raining?  (2)  A: Don't go there 
  B:  m  B:  (Silence) 
In (1) B utters m during A's turn and in (2) B has a turn but chooses to fill it 
with nonactivity (silence). Example 1, thus, shows that an utterance does not 
have to be a turn and example 2 shows that a turn does not need to be an 
utterance. 
 
3.  Grammatical units: An utterance can contain several grammatical units. Cf 
example (3) where, for ease of reference, the grammatical is marked with 
punctuation marks and capitals. 
 
(3) A: Yes! Come tomorrow. Go to the church! Bill will be there, OK? 
     B:  The church, OK 
 
Example (3) shows that utterances are not coterminous with sentences. A's 
utterance contains 2 feedback morphemes and 3 sentences, and B's utterance 
contains an NP and a feedback morpheme but no sentence. 
 
4. Functional features - communicative acts 
 
An utterance can be mono - or multifunctional. If it is multifunctional, its 
multifunctionality can be simultaneous or sequential. A's utterance in example 
(3), for example, contains sequentially the functions feedback giving (cf 
Allwood, Nivre, A1sén, 1992), request, request, statement and response 
elicitation. Furthermore, the statement 'Bill will be there' could simultaneously 
be a promise and, thus, illustrates simultaneous multifunctionality. Functional 
features such as request, statement, promise, could also be called 
"communicative acts". This concept, in turn, has an historical connection to 
concepts like "illocutionary force" Austin (1962) and "speech act", cf Searle 
(1969), and was proposed in Allwood (1976) and Allwood (1978) in order to 
amend some problems with the aforementioned notions. 
 
A communicative act can be defined as a contribution or feature of a contribution 
which can be connected with a communicative intention (purpose, goal or function) 
or a communicative result. The reason for the disjunction in the definition is that 
communicative acts, like actions in general, seem to be identifiable by either 
behavioral form, intention or result, cf . also below section 9. 
 
In summary, thus, the utterance (contribution) is proposed as the basic unit of 
dialogue, where it serves as an anchoring point for other kinds of organization, such 
as the right to communicate (turn taking), grammatical structuring, and functional 
intentional structuring (communicative acts). 
 
 
4.  Dialogue Cohesion 
 
4.1 Basic communicative functions and responsiveness 
 
Let us now investigate some aspects of dialogue cohesion. The point of departure for 
the investigation will be the functional features of utterances. 
 
The claim I want to make is that an important aspect of dialogue cohesion can be derived 
from the following four basic communicative functions 
 1 . Contact 
2. Perception 
3. Understanding 
4. Other attitudinal reactions 
 
The claim is simply that after each utterance the listener (receiver) must evaluate whether 
and how he/she can and/or wants to continue, perceive, understand and in other ways 
attitudinally react to the utterance in question. Besides being a necessary requirement on 
communication, M can also be normatively reconstrued as obligations based on a basic 
human social obligation to be contactable for coordination of information which, in turn, is 
perhaps the most important precondition for social cohesion. Another obligation somewhat 
weaker than that already mentioned is then the obligation to report on the result of the 
evaluation. We could call these obligations the obligations of communicative contactability 
and communicative responsiveness or for short "the obligations of responsiveness". Thus, 
B's various replies in example (4) below, all honor these obligations, even though they are 
clear transgressions against other obligations. 
 
A.  How are you? 
BI:  Shut up, I don't want to listen to you 
B2: I don't have time 
B3:  I don't understand 
B4:  None of your business 
 
Normally, in dialogue, responsiveness is combined with yet other obligations which would 
tend to prohibit B 1 -B4. Examples of such other obligations are given in the maxims 
formulated M Grice (1975) or Allwood (1976). In fact, "responsiveness" can itself be 
considered as a special case of the application of these maxims. Responsiveness is frequently 
combined also with the obligations and conventions which are connected with a particular 
activity or a particular role in an activity. Thus, a pupil in a school class is under a different 
pressure to answer the teacher's questions in the classroom than he is to answer his friends' 
questions during the break. The pupil role reinforces his "responsiveness obligation" in 
relation to the teacher. 
 
4.2 Expressive and evocative dimensions of communication 
 
Let us now combine this analysis of communicative responsiveness with the following 
analysis, cf also Allwood (1976) and (1978). Each communicative act, e.g. statement, 
question, request, exclamation can be said, on the one hand, to count as an expression of an 
attitude (with a content) on the part of the speaker and, on the other hand, to count as an 
attempt to evoke a reaction from the listener. Table 1 summarizes this analysis for the four 
mentioned communicative acts. In statements and exclamations, the expressive dimension is 
more in focus, while in questions and requests the focus, to a greater extent, is on the 
evocative dimension. 
Table 1  Components of dialogue cohesion Analysis of the expressive and 
evocative dimensions of four communicative acts 
Type of commun- 
icative act  Expressive  Evocative 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Statement  belief  (that listener shares) 
 belief  belief judgement 
 
Question  desire for  (that listener provides) 
 information  the desired information 
Request  desire for X  (that listener provides) X 
Exclamation  any attitude  (that listener attends to) 
 attitude 
 
To illustrate the role of the claims made in the table for dialogue cohesion, consider a 
speaker A making a statement like: "It's raining" to a speaker B. According to the 
table, A, thus, expresses his belief that it is raining and wants, or at least has nothing 
against, the same belief being evoked in B. Given the obligation of communicative 
responsiveness, B must now evaluate whether and how he can (and/or wishes to) 
continue, perceive, under-standing and react. Let us assume that he can (and wishes 
to) continue, perceive and understand. Since these are mostly preconditions for a 
reaction, he can now implicitly report on continuation, perception and understanding 
just by reporting on his reaction to the evocative dimension of A's statement. Some 
possible reactions are given in example (5). 
 
(5):  A: It's raining 
 B 1: Yes (it is) 
 B2: Are you sure 
 B3: No (it isn't) 
 
In B 1, B accepts the evocative intention. In B2, he questions A's grounds for the 
expressed belief and, thus, also the grounds for the reasonableness of accepting it as 
his own. In B3, he denies the validity of the expressed belief and by implication, he 
also denies the force of the evocative intention and his own ability (or wish) to 
accept the belief. 
 
4.3 Evaluation and report 
 
All three utterances in B1 -B3, however, respect the obligation of communicative 
responsiveness. Explicitly they report on an evaluation of the evocative dimension in 
A's utterance and implicitly they positively report on the functions of contact, 
perception and understanding. 
 
Thus, an evaluation of all of the four functions of communication can be reported on 
positively or negatively, explicitly or implicitly. Table 2 gives us a survey of the possibilities 
seen as possible replies from a speaker B to a speaker A who has uttered "It's raining" "No 
reply", "any reply" and "irrelevant reply" are meant as descriptions of types of replies rather 
than as instances of replies. 
 
The implicit way of reporting positively on contact, perception and understanding is to let 
what one says presuppose (imply) that one is continuing and has perceived and understood. 
Normally any relevant reply, whether it is positive or negative, would have this 
presupposition. Thus, both the positive replies "yes it is" and the negative "no it isn't sunny" 
normally imply that the speaker is continuing and has heard and understood the previous 
utterance. The difference between the explicit "yes it is" and the implicit "but yesterday it 
was sunny" is that "yes it is" explicitly accepts the previous utterance as true while "but 
yesterday it was sunny" merely implies this. In general, the information that is implied is 
diminished by making any of the four basic communicative functions explicit. We, in fact, 
get a default chain of implications of the following sort, other attitudinal reaction - > 
understanding - > perception - > contact. So, if A says "I hear you" this implies contact but 
not necessarily understanding or any further attitudinal reaction. It is also important to note 
that the implications are default implications since it might be possible, in some cases, to 
hear without continuing, or to understand without hearing properly, or to accept (as an 
example of an attitudinal reaction) without understanding. Even the implication of contact 
might be cancelled if we imagine a case where A by chance utters something to B which by 
C (to whom the utterance is not directed) is experienced as a relevant reply. 
 
Table 2 Positive, negative, implicit, explicit reports on evaluation of a preceding 
utterance "It's raining" 
 
Basic  Positive  Negative 
communicative  explicit   implicit  explicit  implicit 
functions 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
contact  "I will continue"  any reply which pays  I have to go"  no 
  attention to interlocutor  walk away 
 
perception  "I can hear you"  any reply which betrays  "What pardon,  irrelevant 
 that the interlocutor's  sorry (I can't 
 contribution has been  hear you)" 
 perceived 
 
understanding"  I understand"  any reply which betrays  "What, pardon,     irrelevant 
 that the interlocutor's  sorry,I don't   reply 
 contribution has been  understand"  
 understood 
 
other (evoked)  "Yes it is"  "But yesterday  "No it isn't"  "The sound on 
attitudinal    it was sunny"   the window 
    pane is the 
    water from the 
    neighbour's 
    garden hose" 
 
Let us now consider replies which combine different types of reports. Below in examples 
B5- the text in brackets indicates the status of the reply with regard to polarity (positive and 
negative), explicitness (explicit and implicit) and basic communicative function (contact, 
perception, understanding and acceptance as an example of other evoked attitudinal 
reactions). 
 
B5:  I can hear you and I now understand that you are telling me about the weather (pos: 
 expl: perc + pos: expl: underst.). 
 
B6:  I understand you want your raincoat (pos: expl: underst. + pos: impl: underst.). 
 
 
B7:  I understand what you say but you are wrong it isn't (pos: expl: underst. + neg: 
 expl.: accept.) 
 B8: I understand but the sound on the window pane is the water from the neighbour's 
 garden hose (pos: expl: underst. + neg: impl: accept). 
 
Examples B5-B8 show how implicit, explicit, positive and negative features can be 
combined with regard to the different basic communicative functions. 
 
4.4 Interactive communication management 
 
Evaluation and report form an important part of the mechanisms behind interactive 
communication management, with at least the following subfunctions: (1) sequencing, (ii) 
turn management, and (iii) feedback, cf` Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén (1992). Sequencing 
concerns the mechanisms, whereby a dialogue is structured into sequences, subactivities, 
topics, etc. Turn management concerns mechanisms which communicators' use for the 
distribution of the right to occupy the sender role in communication (having the turn) and 
feedback concerns means which communicators use to elicit and give information to each 
other, continuously throughout a dialogue, about the four basic communicative functions 
(contact, perception, understanding and other attitudinal reaction) described above. 
 
The feedback system provides a kind of mini-version of the report system described above. 
With morphemes like yes, no, OK and oh, or mechanisms like repetition and pronominal 
reformulation, all of which are subject to prosodic modification, a speaker unobtrusively can 
combine information about the basic communicative functions with other information. For 
more details, cf` Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén (1992). In fact, feedback morphemes and 
mechanisms, whether they occur as single utterances or as part of a larger utterance (often in 
initial position) are probably the most important cohesion device in spoken language. 
 
 
5. Motivation, rationality, agency and relevance 
 
As we have seen above, one of the levels of organization which are relevant for the study of 
communication allows us to see communicators as rational agents pursuing various motives, 
some of which are cooperative and ethical. In fact, "communicative responsiveness" as 
discussed above, can be seen as a consequence, with regard to communication, of the human 
ability for rational coordinated (cooperative) interaction. 
 
It is, in this connection, of some interest to relate the notion of "relevance" to "cohesion" 
since relevance by several authors has been claimed to play an important role, for among 
other things, dialogue cohesion, cf Schutz (1970), Allwood (1984) and Sperber and Wilson 
(1986). "Relevance" is a relational concept. This basically means that something is not 
"relevant" tout court but something x is relevant for something y with regard to some z in 
some activity A etc. Basic to the notion of "relevance" is, however, that it involves a 
meaningful connection, mostly, in fact, a means-ends relation. To see something as relevant 
is to see which purpose it serves. This has an immediate application to communication, since 
it can be claimed (cf Allwood, 1984) that to understand somebody is to be able to see 
him/her as a motivated rational agent, which entails being able to see his/her actions 
(including communicative actions) as relevant to some purpose. To the extent that another 
person's actions are totally irrelevant, it is not possible to see him/her as a motivated rational 
agent and his/her behavior also becomes incomprehensible. 
 
Probably "incomprehensible" is here, in fact, slightly misleading. To understand a machine 
or a physical process, it is not required that we are able to see the machine or the physical 
process as a motivated, rational agent. It is sufficient that we are able to understand the 
causal mechanisms involved in the machine or in the process. Sometimes it has been 
suggested, cf von Wright (197 1), that the word "understanding" be reserved for 
comprehension involving purpose and intention while the word "explanation" should be 
used for comprehension involving cause and effect. If we follow this terminological 
suggestion, motivated rational action and purpose-related relevance are requirements of 
"understanding". Unmotivated, irrational behavior which has no purpose-related relevance 
can be "explained" but not " understood" in this sense, and since we as communicators, 
usually, want to be "understood" rather than merely "explained", we also primarily try to 
understand others by trying to see them as relevant (motivated rational agents) and only 
secondarily resort to comprehending them by "explanation". 
 
 
6. Dimensions of relevance 
 
Even though participants in a dialogue can be presumed to attempt to achieve relevance both 
in their own contributions and in interpreting the contributions of others, contributions can, 
all the same, be more or less relevant. Below, 1 list four degrees of communicative relevance 
which 1 believe are at work in dialogue. Intuitively what is at stake with regard to degrees of 
relevance, is "importance for the purpose of communication". 
 
(i)  Primary relevance; Here we find explicit or implicit reports of positive or negative 
 evaluations of the most salient evocative intention(s) of the preceding 
 contribution(s), as well as attempts, in the relevant cases, to carry out the tasks 
 implied by the evocative intention. 
 
(ii)  Secondary relevance; secondarily relevant contributions concern lack of contact, 
 perception and understanding. Such contributions are always relevant and have 
 precedence over others, since they concern preconditions for being able to evaluate 
 the main evocative purpose of the preceding communicative contribution. In a sense, 
 what we have here is an analog of the rule in formal meetings that "points of order" 
 always have precedence. These contributions have precedence, but since they 
 concern preconditions of communication rather than its main function, I have 
 considered them secondarily relevant. 
 
(iii)  Tertiary relevance; Tertiary relevance could perhaps be accorded to positive or 
 negative contributions concerning overall purposes of the activity of which the 
 dialogue is a part. Cf. C's contribution in example (6) below. 
 
 (6)  AI:  Coward 
  B:  Liar 
  C:  Please remember the purpose of this meeting. 
  A2:  Not only is he a coward, now he spilled coffee on me 
 
Also contributions concerning various preconditions of a preceding contribution 
belong here. B's contribution in example (6) is an example of this. Both "coward" 
and "liar" are statements, even though in elliptical form, and thus presuppose belief 
on the part of the speakers. B's contribution, therefore, becomes relevant as a 
statement to the effect that this presupposed condition is not met by A, ie A does not 
really believe that B is a coward. 
 
(iv)  Quaternary relevance; Possibly a fourth degree of relevance could be accorded 
to contributions concerning other contextually available aspects. For example, such 
aspects as are available through perception in the speech situation or through 
cognitive activation caused by preceding discourse. A's second contribution in 
example 6 above exemplifies both of these features. 
In principle, 1 believe that these four types of relevance capture important aspects of 
what it means to be more or less relevant to the ongoing purpose of dialogue 
communication. By implication 1 would also claim that 1 have captured an important 
part of the basis for what it means for a dialogue to be more or less cohesive. 
 
 
7. Other Approaches 
 
Let me finally briefly contrast the approach described here with the approaches of Paul Grice 
and Herbert Clark. 
 
In Grice (1957) and in subsequent articles, Grice (1969), it is claimed that what distinguishes 
"natural meaning" from "non-natural meaning" is that "a non-natural meaning X' has to arise 
by virtue of some agent A's intention that some agent B should realize X by recognizing A's 
intention to mean X, while in the case of "natural meaning", no such mediation of meaning 
via intended recognition of some agent's intention is necessary. Insofar as Grice's account of 
"nonnatural meaning" also can be seen as an account of communication, the present account 
differs from Grice's in not making recognition of intention (and, thus, "non-natural 
meaning") a necessary requirement on communication. Natural meaning in Grice's and 
everybody else's sense can be communicated and comprehended in the sense of "explained" 
but also in the sense of "understood", if it is seen as purposeful. Natural meaning can be 
communicated if it is connected with appropriate communicative intentions (display or 
signal, cf Allwood, 1976) and can subsequently be explained or understood. As far as 1 can 
see, Grice's criterion for nonnatural meaning, if extended to communication, will only be 
met in the case where there is successful recognition of another agent's intention to 
communicate "that he is communicating meaning W, which in very many cases is not 
required in normal communication, where it is sufficient that meaning M is simply 
communicated. The present account also differs from 
 
Grice's in having a more detailed breakdown of the various features of communicative 
intentionality. In this paper, this mainly concerns what I have referred to as the expressive 
and evocative functions of a communicative act. For further analysis of communicative 
intentionality cf. Allwood 1976 and 1978. 
 
The present account also differs from the account given in Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), 
Clark and Schaefer (1989). In these papers, a notion of collaborative speech acts is put 
forward and it is suggested that the appropriate metaphor for dialogue is the musical concert, 
where the musicians together produce a coherent output. One main difference between the 
present account and the account in Clark and Schaefer can be brought out by the following 
examples: 
 
(7)  I warned him but he did not hear me. 
(8)  I was referring to Bertrand Russell but she did not hear me. 
(9)  I warned him unintentionally 
(10)  I referred unintentionally to Bertrand Russell 
 
According to Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark and Schaefer neither (7) nor (8) describe 
possible state of affairs. It is not possible to perform a communicative act (speech act), 
without success in the form of an appropriate reaction taking place in a receiver, connected 
to an appropriate response of recognition of the speech act. Because, if it were possible, this 
would mean that communicative acts could occur without being collaborative. Similarly, 
although less clearly stated, it seems that neither 9 nor 10 would be possible since actions 
should be intentional. 1 believe that, in fact, all four cases are possible because of an 
indeterminacy in our conception of action. As far as this conception surfaces through the use 
of verbs for communicative acts in the natural languages, 1 am acquainted with, it allows for 
an indeterminacy or underspecificity with regard to the identity criteria of these actions. It 
seems that the intention, behavioral form or actual result (in some cases context) of some 
behaviour are all, taken one by one, sufficient to allow a particular type of behavior to be 
identified as a particular type of action. 
 
This means that, at least as far as the conception of action which surfaces in ordinary 
language is concerned, communicative acts need neither necessarily be intentional nor 
resultative and the fact they need not be resultative, in turn, means that they need not be 
collaborative. An individual communicator can make a contribution (perform a 
communicative act) without being perceived or understood. He or she can even make a 
contribution unintentionally. Above all, even when a contribution is intentional and 
understood, it need not be responded to overtly in order to count as communication. Imagine 
only the following case which involves interactive, collaborative communication without 
overt response. 
 
(ii)  A. Think of a number 
 B: (no response but hears, understands and thinks of a number) 
 A. Double it and then multiply it by three 
 B: (no response but hears, understands and mentally carries out the operations) 
 
Contributions in the form of "acknowledging feedback", cf Allwood (1976), are not needed 
to constitute speech acts but rather to inform the interlocutor of the extent to which his 
communicative objectives are met and sometimes, although rarely, we can communicate 
without feedback. 
 
Successful communicative interaction (dialogue) is therefore not due to the fact that a single 
communicative act is necessarily collective and collaborative. Rather it is due to the fact that 
cooperation, and interactive communication to be successful, require that individuals employ 
single communicative acts of sending and receiving (understanding) in such a way that a 
kind of collaboration results. 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
It has been my purpose, in this paper, to explicate some parts of the multilayered nature of 
dialogue cohesion. My account has focussed on what 1 above have called the psychological 
level, ie properties of dialogue which can be related to the fact that communicators are 
perceiving, understanding and emotional beings who also can be seen as rational motivated 
agents whose mutual communicative attunement to some extent is enabled and constrained 
by what I have called the "obligation of responsiveness" or more generally by maxims of 
rational, motivated action. 
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